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本文通过回顾非政府组织的发展历程及其在国
际政治中的作用，考察国际环境非政府组织对中国
环境治理的影响，以及中国境外非政府组织境内活
动管理法《中华人民共和国境外非政府组织境内活
动管理法》的主要含义。通过对国际气候变化会
议中中国领导层行为历时变化的分析，探讨了中国
国际环境非政府组织的现状、决策和项目。本文认
为，国际环境非政府组织对保护中国环境、形成公
民社会以及加强环境保护意识和公众参与意识起到
了积极作用。《中华人民共和国境外非政府组织境
内活动管理法》的实现对国际环境非政府组织起到
了更为严格的监督作用，其效果有待进一步研究。
The paper examines the impact that 
international ENGOs have had on Chinese 
environment situation and the implication of 
the Law of People’s Republic of China on the 
Administration of the Activities of Overseas 
Nongovernmental Organisations in Mainland 
China. Based on the review of historical profile 
of NGOs and their enhanced role within the 
international politics, the paper analyzes 
China’s leadership evolutionary behaviour in 
international climate change conferences and 
investigates the international ENGOs’ current 
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status, strategies and projects in China. The 
paper argues that international ENGOs have had 
a positive, even if limited, impact in protecting 
Chinese environment and in supporting Chinese 
civil society to emerge and strengthening the 
public participation and awareness. It also argues 
that, the implementation of the new law certainly 
puts international NGOs under higher scrutiny; 
however, further implications are, to date, only 
partially predictable. 
Key words: International NGO; climate change; 
international politics; the Law of People’s Republic 
of China on the Administration of the Activities 
of Overseas Nongovernmental Organisations in 
Mainland China; Chinese civil society.
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1. Introduction
In the last 40 years China’s economic development has been 
impressive. It has contributed to huge transformations that reshaped 
the geopolitical context, giving to China a preeminent role in the world 
politics. The opening-up reform, launched by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, firstly 
established the “socialism with Chinese characteristics”1, it accelerated 
agriculture decollectivization and promoted country’s aperture to 
foreign investments. Secondly, it expedited China’s participation into the 
international community (Dillon, 2012). The reform caused massive social 
and cultural changes, it produced internal migration from the rural areas 
to the cities and emancipated 200 million Chinese citizens from poverty 
(Davin, 2004, cited in Dillon, 2012).
Likewise, drawbacks have been dramatic: inequality swiftly increased 
and environmental issues related to air and water pollution, biodiversity loss, 
wildlife migration and dramatical climate change increased (Shapiro, 2012). 
As for China’s involvement in the international community, it relevantly 
1 Expression coined by the former leader Deng Xiaoping who described the new Chinese socialism 
as devoted to capitalism and to the economic reform. Full speech may be consulted at: http://
newlearningonline.com/new-learning/chapter-4/deng-xiaoping-socialism-with-chinese-characteristics 
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increased its participation and its influence in international conferences and 
meetings of multilateral organisations, becoming an active and integral part 
of the global system. Besides attracting foreign investments and facilitating 
international cultural and educational exchanges, China’s government 
sought for international community contribution to China’s development 
(Shieh, 2012). Its entrance in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 
affirmed its new role within the international community and showed its 
intention to adapt and become an integral part of the global system. In the 
process of adapting to international norms, China improved its commitment 
to sustainable development, climate change and environment pollution by 
participating more actively in international climate change conferences. 
In this framework, international NGOs (INGOs) started to operate in China 
from the early 80s. Since their arrival in China, INGOs are experiencing a 
contentious and fast-changing status: they have been deemed as useful and 
necessary partners because owners of advanced technology and professional 
expertise and, at the same time, as threatening entities because bearers of 
western democratic values (Shieh, 2012). The study provides an overview 
on NGOs’ history by underlining their main features and characteristics and 
looks at China’s improved attention to environment protection by analyzing 
China’s leadership evolutionary behaviour in climate change international 
negotiations. This study tries to shed more light on what the impact that 
international ENGOs have had in China and how the Chinese government 
is dealing with their presence to confirm a positive, even though limited, 
impact of international ENGOs on Chinese environment protection and it 
also tries to analyze reasons and future implications of the new law.
2. Methodology
The present study is principally based on secondary resources: by 
looking at the extant relevant literature, by analyzing annual reports, 
programs and projects that international ENGOs have carried out in 
China. A deductive approach and a descriptive and explanatory method 
are employed in order to understand to what extent the international 
ENGOs have contributed to environment protection in China and to explain 
reasons and effects of the partnerships and network they have established. 
By focusing on projects implemented by three major international ENGOs 
(World Wildlife Fund, The Nature Conservancy and Greenpeace) a lack 
of representativeness of the whole international ENGOs’ reality in China 
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may occur. However, their relevant presence within the international 
community and their long-lasting experience in China, make them valuable 
examples to explain which strategies an international ENGO has to employ 
to have a significant impact on Chinese environment protection and on 
Chinese civil society. In the attempt to analyze implications of the “Law 
on the Administration of the Activities of Overseas Nongovernmental 
Organisations in Mainland China”, implemented in January 2017, the study 
evaluates the current status of things, which is subjected to rapid evolution 
in the next years. 
3. NGOs: Definition, history and ivolutionary role in international 
environmental negotiations 
Providing a precise definition for NGOs is extremely difficult and 
generalisation may be inaccurate and, to some extent, even misleading. 
DeMars (2005), Fowler (1997), Jordan and Van Tuijl (2006) and McCormick 
(2004) define NGOs as self-governing, private, non-profit groups of people 
(or organisations) who act outside the formal structures of government in 
an institutionalized manner devoted to a social mission. In this study I adopt 
the definition of NGO that Fazi and Smith (2006: 17) provide, defining them 
as “organizations who share most (if not all) of the following features”: non-
state actors; non-profit making organizations; democratic organizations 
(joining is voluntary and free, the functioning of the organization is based 
upon democratic rules); independent from government; act in the public 
interest; rely on voluntary work and activists’ involvement, but often also 
employ professionals; have a mandate from their constituency. 
Sharing these basic and key traits, NGOs are employed in many 
different areas with a wide range of approaches and commitments, making 
NGOs a heterogeneous body. A primary distinction needs to be made 
between Northern and Southern NGOs. Fowler (1997) claims that Northern 
NGOs have arisen from political affiliations for the promotion of national 
values to tackle specific issues, to advance in technological solutions and 
to promote particular ideologies. On the contrary, what mainly shaped 
Southern NGOs is their historical and social dimension, which encompasses 
a previous domination of foreign power and Western colonisation. That is 
the reason why Southern NGOs arose from independence struggles (Clark, 
1991). Applying the North-South distinction to NGOs involved in environment 
protection field, it results in the Northern NGOs focused in handling the 
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environmental consequences of the industrialization and the Southern NGOs 
blaming the state of extreme poverty as the main cause of environment 
degradation (Sachdev, 2007). Weiss and Gordenker (1996) propose an 
alternative method of categorisation, which results particularly relevant 
for China’s sociopolitical context. Employing a difference in the structural 
organization, they identify three variations: GONGOs (Government-organised 
non-governmental organisation) which are established and supervised by 
the government. QUANGOs (quasi-nongovernmental organisation) which 
receive most of their resources from public funds. Their action is committed 
to international-endorsed objectives and even if they depend on public 
funds, their actions are separated from the governments’. DONGOs (donor-
organised non-governmental organisation) which are principally based on 
funds from voluntary donations. 
While the differentiation of the last two types mainly consists in 
funding, GONGOs’ peculiarity consists in the higher level of influence 
and control exerted by the government. The relation that a given NGO 
maintains with a government is strictly connected to the political context 
of the given country and, consequently, the degree to which NGOs may 
influence governments, highly depends on that relationship. In the last few 
years, China has also witnessed an extreme dynamism of the Chinese civil 
society alongside with an enhanced public participation in social issues. The 
increased attention to environmental issues has facilitated a rapid growth 
and development of local NGOs, whose peculiarities will be underlined in 
the following points. 
3.1. Magic or illusion?
As voluntary, non-profit and independent organisations engaged 
in social mission, NGOs own strong and innovative peculiarities which 
empower them of a high level of trust and, at the same time, tangible 
weaknesses. The formal independence from government allows NGOs to 
have a high degree of community participation and to provide quicker 
solutions to community’s needs. NGOs hold the capacity to reach the rural 
poor located in remote areas hardly accessible and where governments’ 
programs are limited or ineffective (Cernea, 1988). Besides the capacity 
to arrive where government is not able to, NGOs empower local people to 
take part in the social transformation. As Mccarthy (1992, cited in Weiss 
and Gordenker, 1996: 19) states: NGOs serve undeserved or neglected 
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populations to expand the freedom or to empower people, to engage in 
advocacy for social change, and to provide services. 
Thanks to their particular status, they are deemed as innovative 
and flexible. They are able to experiment and attempt in implementing 
new projects thanks to a highly committed and motivated staff. Flexibility 
contributes to make NGOs problem-oriented and non-bureaucratic entities, 
owners of a broad knowledge regarding the emancipation of the poor 
(Matanga, 2010). Often, large part of the NGO staff is made up by local 
people, a thing that facilitates and accelerates the progress of addressing 
people needs and necessities. High level of commitment is ensured by the 
shared values of social change mission and to the work itself rather than 
to the organisation (Clark, 1991). Staff members participatory behaviour 
is strengthened by the bottom-up nature of NGOs that enable them to pay 
more attention and respect to local values, creativity, knowledge, ideas 
and to provide local people with the opportunities to take part in planning 
agenda and projects according to their primary needs (Kang, 2011). 
Because of these peculiarities, NGOs also have many weaknesses that, 
to some extent, endanger their outcomes and jeopardize their existence. 
As Annis (1987: 129) notices: In the face of pervasive poverty “politically 
independent” can mean “powerless” or “disconnected”, “innovative” can 
mean simply “temporary” or “unsustainable”.
The hardest challenge NGOs face is the problem of accountability. 
Jordan and Van Tuijl (2006) describe a trend from the XX century which 
sees states as necessary and predominant actors in ensuring safety and 
development and collocates NGOs accountability focused on balancing 
multiple responsibilities to different stakeholders, deemed as highly 
trustworthy by the public opinion. However, accountability, as Clark (1991: 
72) states, “does not challenge the effectiveness of the projects supported 
but whether the funds go to where they were supposed to.” As Havrda and 
Kutìlek (2010) underline, thanks to their impressive development, today 
NGOs are able to influence in planning and implementation in various EU 
policies areas, therefore they need to strengthen their accountability. 
Limited technical capacity and poor staff quality may also affect negatively 
NGOs’ activity. Moreover, many projects are often launched without proper 
analyses and sufficient relevant data that inevitably compromise their 
success (Cernea, 1988). Another complication has been noticed by Clark 
118
International ENGOs in China: a Significant 
Presence and a Fast-Changing Reality
中国国际环境非政府组织的发展现状
与变化研究
Sinologia Hispanica, China Studies Review, 5, 2 (2017), pp. 113-148
(1991) who, by looking at the leadership, reported that importance of the 
development of leadership skills and management training is generally 
underestimated. In the Chinese sociopolitical context, leadership issue is 
even more complicated because of the high dependence on a charismatic 
and strong figure who is necessary for the success of a social organisation 
in the long run (Ho, 2001). 
3.2. China’s leadership behavioural trajectory within international 
climate change conferences: A spiral model 
In order to explain the evolutionary behaviour of China’s leadership 
in international climate change conferences, I will apply the spiral model 
that has been developed as ‘a theory of the stages and mechanisms 
through which international norms can lead to changes in behaviour’ 
(Risse et al 1999, cited in Schroeder, 2008: 509).2 While Schroeder (2008) 
applies it to explain the pathway of China’s global environmental policies 
internalization, I will utilise it to show the evolutionary behaviour 
of China’s leadership in climate change conferences and its increased 
commitment to fight climate change. It consists in five different phases: 
Repression, denial, tactical concession, prescriptive status, and role-
consistent behaviour.
The first phase, Phase of repression (1972-1992) starts with the UN 
Conference on Human Environment (UNCHE) held in Stockholm in 1972, 
which introduced China to the global environmental discussion and 
represented the first step towards an improved attention to environmental 
issues as a national and global matter. Despite it represented a turning point 
for China, its behaviour at the conference has been deemed defensive, 
blaming the West for the seriousness of global environmental problems. 
China’s participation certainly demonstrated an increased consideration of 
environmental issues, however it also confirmed that the opening-up reform 
and economic development, which seriously heightened pollution rates 
and drained China’s natural resources, remained Chinese government’s 
top priority (Heggelund and Backer, 2007; Stalley, 2013). Throughout the 
70s and 80s China’s behaviour in international climate change negotiations 
2 For further details about the spiral model look at Schroeder (2008: 507-509). 
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has been influenced by two key principles which showed its steady and 
rigorous position: the equity principle and the common but differentiated 
responsibilities (CBDR) principle. Retaining developed countries as the 
main responsible for the gravity of global environment is the foundation of 
the equity principle. 
Phase of denial (1992-COP13), the interim period between the UNCHE 
and UNCED held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 signed a behavioural shift from 
contestation to participation among developing countries’ leaderships 
(Najam, 2005). As one of the most relevant outcome of the UNCED, by 
integrating the Agenda 21 in the 9th Five Years Plan (FYP), China adopted 
a sustainable development concept at national level policy (Heggelund 
and Backer, 2007). It represented an enhanced attention to environment 
pollution, however, the Beijing Ministerial declaration on the Environment 
and Development (1991) made clear that economic development remained 
China’s top-priority stating that Beijing will resist to any external diplomatic 
pressure that could endanger the course of China’s development (Ong, 
2012).
The ratification of United Nations Framework Conferences on Climate 
Changes (UNFCCC) in 1992 and Kyoto Protocol (KP) in 1998, perfectly 
reflected China’s intention to mitigate with environmental issues without 
compromising its economic development and its status of developing 
country. As a Non-Annex I country3, China had no binding emission limit in 
either treaties (Lewis, 2007). Coming into force in 2005, Kyoto Protocol 
(1998) established that, between 2008-2012, only Annex-I parties were 
committed to reduce emissions of six GHG to roughly 5% comparing to the 
1990 levels. Moreover, article 10 reaffirmed the CBDR principle by stating 
that all parties have to take into account “common but differentiated 
responsibilities and specific national and regional development priorities, 
objectives and circumstances” (Kyoto Protocol, 1998). Among the 
mechanisms established under the KP, the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM)4 perfectly showed China’s initial skeptical behaviour shifting into 
3 List of the Non-Annex I countries is visible at the following link: http://unfccc.int/parties_and_
observers/parties/non_annex_i/items/2833.php 
4 The article 12 of the KP (1998) establishes the CDM. It allows a developing country to host activities 
and projects, managed by developed countries, to facilitate emissions’ reduction. This process helps 
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a fully sustain (Wu, 2013). When the mechanism was proposed at COP3 
in Brazil, China strongly rejected it because it saw it as the occasion for 
developed countries to avoid binding emissions cut and an opportunity to 
penetrate into developing countries. 
The negotiations for an international environmental treaty to the 
UNFCCC started at first Conference of parties (COP1) in 1995. The parties 
to the convention meet annually to evaluate progresses and actions to 
adopt regarding climate change. Throughout the 90s and the first years of 
the XXI century, China’s leadership behaviour has been dominated by the 
necessity to prioritize economic development and therefore it employed 
the CBDR and equity principles in order to prevent any binding commitment 
to be implemented. During COP5, China clearly stated that it would not 
undertake any binding commitments until it would achieve a “medium 
development level” (International Institute for Sustainable Development, 
1999: 13).
During the phase of tactical concession (COP13), China made two 
significant concessions which revealed its intention to strengthen its 
commitment to reduce GHG emission and put them under stricter control. 
They consisted in “accepting the ‘nationally appropriate mitigation 
actions’ (NAMAs) to mitigate GHG emissions and put them under either 
measuring, reporting, and verifying (MRV) or international consultation 
and analysis (ICA)” (Wu, 2013: 787). In this occasion, China also agreed 
to negotiate on a new binding protocol for all parties. The importance of 
the COP13 relied in the fact that China and Group of 77 agreed on the fact 
that MRV mitigations actions not only should be measured and reported, 
but also verified. Besides country’s individual commitments, COP13 has 
been deemed as a core moment in climate change negotiations because of 
the shared vision for a long-term cooperation in terms of global emission 
reductions, actions on mitigations and technology and financing assistance 
for the post-KP period (Christoff, 2010).
The high expectations for the phase of prescriptive status (COP15) 
(2009), or the Copenhagen Summit, to provide a new legally binding protocol 
for all the parties have been deceived. At the end of the Conference no 
developing countries in accumulating credits which can be traded (Zaman and Hughes, 2012).
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new binding commitment for gas emission to maintain global average 
temperature increase under 2 degrees was established, and the nature of 
the funds (public or private) to take climate change action and to provide 
technology transfer from developed to developing countries was not 
clarified (Clegg, 2011). The failure of the Copenhagen Summit in providing 
a new legally binding protocol with mandatory mitigation targets has been 
addressed to China and its obstructive behaviour. Christoff (2010: 647) 
explains China’s leadership steady position as a “nationalistic assertion of 
its sovereign rights” and, by blocking global and Annex I countries emissions 
goal for 2050, it provided the opportunity to avoid any external threat 
which may restrict and limit China’s future emissions. By prioritizing, again, 
internal factors and domestic interests throughout international climate 
change negotiations, proved China’s leadership intention to prevent any 
external influence threatening its economic growth path. 
In contrast to the low-point in history of climate change reached at 
the COP15 (Savaresi, 2016), COP21, held in Paris in 2015, represented an 
unprecedented global collaboration in producing a universal legally binding 
agreement (Ivanova, 2016) and the phase of role-consistent behaviour. 
Paris Agreement’s (2015) most important outcomes are the set of a long-
term goal of “holding the increase in the global average temperature to 
well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the 
temperature increase to 1.5°C above preindustrial levels” (article 2.1) and 
the aim to global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible, 
to undertake rapid reductions thereafter achieve a balance between 
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse 
gases in the second half of this century (article 4.1).
The efficiency of the Paris Agreement still needs to be tested and the 
melioration of the global environment still need to be proved, however, the 
current status of ratification, which shows 169 out of 197 parties who have 
already ratified it5, represents a good premise. In conclusion, compared to 
the Copenhagen Summit, COP21 was a successful diplomatic negotiation 
thanks also to China’s contribution. Its behavioural shift from steady and 
obstructive toward cooperative and flexible could be explained by the fact 
5 Updated on October 25th 2017.
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that, at the end of the 12th FYP (2011-2015), international climate change 
arrangements no longer represented a threat to the Chinese economy 
development. By reducing carbon intensity and employing a slower and 
less-intensive energy growth, China was able to make the international 
commitment to peak emissions around 2030 (Hilton and Kerr, 2017), 
putting China in the privileged position of “under-promise” and “over-
deliver” (Green and Stern, 2017: 436). Moreover, Paris Agreement provided 
China with an unexpected opportunity to further enhance its position on 
the international stage as a global leader in the environment protection 
because of the recent US withdrawl from the Paris Agreement. 
4. International ENGOs in China
4.1. Current situation
With the opening-up reform (1978) China not only opened the doors to 
foreign investments, but also started to welcome international community 
to assist in China’s development (Shieh, 2012). Its interest in joining 
international community and the fast-growing influence of international 
civil society in global politics, both facilitated INGOs’ penetration in China 
(Ma, 2006). In addition, China’s rapid economic growth, based on a heavy 
coal and oil consumption and its harmful impact on environment and 
climate change, attracted environmentalists and activists from all over 
the world (Chen, 2010). All these factors contributed to a fast-increasing 
presence of INGOs in China. Ma (2006, no pagination) well photographs this 
phenomenon: “Chinese government allowed INGOs to have their fingers in a 
good variety of domestic matters ranging from economic cooperation, legal 
construction, development of social communities, battles against poverty 
and disasters, protection of environment, prevention and treatment of 
AIDS, culture and art, medical care, education of all levels, women’s health 
programs and reproduction health.” 
Starting from the 80s, INGOs presence in China drastically increased. 
However, since many of them do not have a registered office in China, 
stating their exact number is a complicated matter. According to CDB’s6 
6 See: http://chinadevelopmentbrief.cn/ CDB was founded in order to provide media and 
communication, research and consulting, services and networking to NGOs, foundations, development 
practitioners, businesses, researchers, and policy makers.
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database, one of the most reliable sources, 189 INGOs are currently active 
in China in many different fields (Table 1): 
Table 1: INGOs presence in China (CDB)7
Field Number Field Number
Education 58 Labour and Migrants 8
Environment 56 Culture 7
Emergency/Disaster 
Relief
19 Animal protection 6
Community 
development
30 Media/Information 6
Children 25 Volunteering 6
Capacity building 24 Poverty Alleviation 5
Rural development 24 Social Enterprises 5
Health 52 Microfinance 2
HIV/AIDS 18
International 
Relations
2
Disabilities 16 Ethnic minorities 1
Law and Governance 15 Social Work 1
Woman 12 Think Tanks 1
Environment is the second most relevant field in terms of INGOs 
presence. According to the CDB’s database, international ENGOs’ distribution 
on Chinese territory is clearly uneven: most of them are located in South-
Western China and in Beijing area. Concentration in poorer provinces such 
as Sichuan, Yunnan, Tibet, Qinghai could be explained by Chinese leadership 
restrictive behaviour toward civil society in the richest provinces, while the 
offices in Beijing provide a direct contact with central authorities (Chen, 
2010). 
7 Updated on 25th October 2017. The total number of INGOs in the table is larger than the INGOs 
registered because many NGOs are active in more than one field.
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4.2. Common goals but different strategies
The increasing impoverishment of Chinese environment affected 
water and air quality, endangered animal species survival, harmed natural 
habitats and facilitated climate change (Shapiro, 2012). Since their arrival, 
international ENGOs started to be engaged in many different areas in order 
to safeguard lands, freshwater and oceans, to fight climate change and to 
enhance cities’ air quality. By focusing on three different areas, I will look at 
the projects and different strategies employed by three major international 
ENGOs: the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), The Nature Conservancy (TNC) and 
Greenpeace. 
4.2.1. Forestry and animal protection
Since 1998, TNC is working on restoration of Yunnan’s forest in order 
to safeguard golden monkey natural habitat. In collaboration with Yunnan’s 
government and local communities, TNC have planted 3.2 million trees, 
730.000 just along 2016. Its action also contributed to protect golden 
monkey population which has increased from 1000, in the 70s, to the current 
3000. Its intervention has not been limited to the reforestation project; by 
installing more than 12.000 alternative energy units in houses and schools 
in 420 different villages, TNC got local communities involved in protecting 
golden monkey natural habitat and contributed to highlight the importance 
of shifting toward a more eco-friendly livelihood (The Nature Conservancy, 
2016). Greenpeace has conducted a two-year investigation which revealed 
an illegal logging activity in Ya’an city prefecture, in Sichuan Province. 
According to its records, it has caused the loss of 3,200 acres of pristine 
natural forest. Greenpeace East Asia (GPEA) discovered loopholes which 
allow an area of nationally and internationally recognised significance 
to be exploited for profit endanger local wildlife and global treasures, 
severely undermining the Chinese government’s effort to preserve its and 
the world’s natural heritage (Greenpeace, 2015b).
GPEA’s findings highlighted how logging activity caused not only 
serious damages to the natural heritage of the giant panda reservation, 
but it also endangered survival chance of the rare Chinese yew. Being 
a direct violation of the article 40 of the People’s Republic of China 
Forest Law (Guowuyuan, 1998d)8, Greenpeace denunciation facilitated 
8 Article 40 of the People’s Republic of China Forest Law literally states: “Whoever illegally fells 
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Sichuan Forestry Bureau to launch an investigation (Greenpeace, 2015b) 
which resulted in 23 cases filed, 22 officials held accountable and the 
loophole’s closure (Greenpeace, 2016b). As one of the first international 
ENGOs active in China, WWF is also highly committed to safeguard and 
protect natural environment of endangered animal species. The Green 
Heart of China—Yangtze River Giant Panda Protection and Sustainable 
Development Project was a two-phase project (2007-2010, 2011-2013) 
which aimed to “safeguard the long-term sustainable recovery of the giant 
panda population and its habitat from the threats of natural disasters 
such as earthquakes and climate change”(WWF, 2010: 14). The project 
consisted of five main sections: mitigation and adaptation of key threats 
of infrastructures, mass tourism and climate changes; key corridors and 
critical forests management; sustainable livelihoods and alternative 
energies; communications for better administrative management; policy 
advocacy and promotion of law and regulation review, guideline releasing 
and generalization of piloted practices at regional, provincial and national 
levels. With the realization of this project, WWF estimated that “by 2030, 
a viable giant panda population will live in the well-managed forests of the 
upper reaches of the Yangtze River, which in turn will provide ecological 
services to the people living further downstream” (WWF, no date: 17). This 
project is particularly relevant because it accounted for many distinguished 
partners which contributed to its realization. Besides the help from WWF 
network donors and a large participation of volunteers, WWF could count 
on the collaboration from Chinese government’s key departments such as 
Ministry of Environment (MEP), State Forestry Administration, Shaanxi, 
Sichuan and Gansu forestry Departments.
4.2.2. Yangtze River
The Yangtze River is the longest river in Asia. From its source on 
the Plateau of Tibet to its mouth on the East China Sea, the river passes 
through 10 provinces with a total length of 3,915 miles (6,300 kilometres). 
Nearly one-third of the national population lives in its basin (Pavlovich 
Muranov and Greer, no date). Today, the Yangtze River is home to the 
largest dam in the world, the Three Gorges dam. Its construction aimed 
or destroys rare and precious trees in violation of the provisions of this Law shall be investigated of 
criminal liability according to law”. 
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to reduce the flood hazard, to generate an adequate electricity amount 
to meet the industrial and domestic demand in Eastern and Central 
China and to improve navigation along the Yangtze River (Wilmsen et 
al., 2011). Different international ENGOs have intervened in the area in 
order to safeguard animal species survival and to moderate hydroelectric 
dams’ environmental impact. WWF is engaged in the area by improving 
management of the water resources and by enhancing nature’s resilience 
to climate change. It contributed in stretching the Protected Areas Network 
(PA) to 102 areas, covering 1,850,000 ha9 of wetland area. Led by the State 
Forestry Administration, its establishment
laid the foundation to conserve more than 3000km2  of wetlands 
in the central and lower ranges of the Yangtze; [and] contributed to 
[an] effective protection of more than 50 endangered species like the 
Yangtze alligator (Alligator sinensis) and Pere David’s deer (Elaphurus 
davidianus); and raised the resistibility and resilience of the wetlands 
ecosystem, which is impacted by climate change at a river basin level 
(WWF, 2010: 24).
Regarding the Three Gorges dam project, WWF partnered with 
Chinese government and the Three Gorges Dam Corporation by signing the 
5-year Memorandum of Understanding in March 2010 “in order to maximize 
the ecological, economic and social benefits downstream” (WWF, 2010: 
24). The Memorandum has been signed also by TNC (International Rivers, 
no date). TNC’s commitment to safeguard Yangtze natural environment is 
similar to the WWF’s: TNC established a New Global Centre for Sustainable 
Hydropower to help Chinese and international hydropower companies to 
take a more environmental friendly approach (The Nature Conservancy, 
2015). Through the collaboration with Chinese government and major 
hydropower companies, TNC is working on how to reduce dam’s effect 
on Yangtze’s natural flow which would have a negative impact on fish 
migration and on traditional agricultural methods. By collaborating with 
Three Gorges dam’s operators, TNC helped in modifying the amount of 
water which flows through the structure, resembling more the natural 
river’s course and increasing the supply of protein sources (The Nature 
Conservancy, 2014). Greenpeace’s action focused on testing the presence 
9 Symbol for one hectare. One hectare corresponds to 10,000 m2. 
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of hazardous chemicals in four different location along the Yangtze 
River’s path. Its investigation revealed a “widespread presence of certain 
hazardous chemicals within wild fish from the upper, middle and lower 
sections of the Yangtze River” (Greenpeace, 2010: 15). GPEA concluded 
that China urgently needed a sound plan to reduce, restrict and eliminate 
the release of various hazardous chemicals. 
4.2.3. Air pollution
Another major issue related to Chinese environment is air pollution. 
Over the course of the economic and the opening-up reform, logging 
activity increased by the 25% in the period between 1978/1986 and the coal 
consumption doubled from 600 million tons to more than 1.2 billion metric 
tons (Economy, 2004), reaching the dramatic peak of 3.6 billion tons in 2013 
(Jing, 2015). Coal and oil consumption are considered the main responsible 
for the release of PM2.5. In order to lower the progressive reduction of 
the forest coverage, which today is assessed at 16.55%, well below the 
world average of 27% (Economy, 2004), and to tackle coal consumption, 
international ENGOs have launched projects which may help. In Liangshan 
region, in Sichuan Province, TNC, in collaboration with Novartis10, the 
Chinese government and the Liangshan community, is restoring 3,900 
hectares of lush forest. Carbon for parks project directly involves local 
villagers and is estimated to remove 40.000 tons of carbon emission yearly 
over the next 30 years (TNC, no date). Even though it was hard to explain 
to local people the concept of carbon sequestration, they soon realized 
the benefit of the project and as a CDM project, it also generates emission 
reduction credits (Lan Lan, 2014). This is particularly relevant because it 
shows how international ENGOs and Chinese government relationship could 
be fruitful in carrying out a project which simultaneously benefits local 
communities and corporations under an international mechanism (CDM). 
Greenpeace action focused on the release of PM2.5 in the Jingjinji area 
(Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei). Its investigation, run together with a team 
led by Dr. Dabo Guan from the University of Leeds, concluded that “PM2.5 
emissions in Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei mainly come from coal-fired power 
generation, industrial production, combustions of small-scale boilers 
for commercial and domestic purposes and the transportation sector” 
10 Novartis is a global healthcare company based in Switzerland.
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(Greenpeace, 2013: 46). It therefore pointed out that if stronger efforts 
will not be made in order to reduce PM2.5 releases, the National Air Quality 
Standard Level II of 35 µg/m3 will not be achieved until 2030.
This picture shows that international ENGOs, being involved in 
many different fields in order to protect endangered species, preserve 
their natural habitat and enhance environmental status, have a relevant 
role in Chinese environment protection. It also highlights how most of 
their projects are run together with the Chinese government and private 
companies, reaffirming the idea that Chinese government collaboration 
and support is something strictly needed to have a considerable impact on 
environment protection (Chen, 2010; Hsia and White, 2002). However, this 
picture shows also that international ENGOs employ different strategies. 
TNC and WWF usually launch their projects partnering with central or 
local government and other organisations. Through the years TNC and 
WWF collaboration with Chinese government has always been tight. As 
Chen (2010) noticed, WWF has been also a resourceful support for Chinese 
government to spread environmental awareness in schools by compiling, 
for example, the Environmental education implementation guideline for 
middle and primary school, which was adopted by the government in 2003, 
while TNC helped in providing experts’ support when the Environment and 
Resources Protection Committee of the National People’s Congress started 
to work on a Protected area law. Greenpeace’s action usually starts by 
investigating and, when necessarily, by denouncing an illegal or harmful 
behaviour in order to attract Chinese institutions’ attention to take action. 
This strategy has also been particularly effective to draw attention on the 
illegal fishery activities committed by Chinese vessels in West African waters 
(Greenpeace, 2016a). Greenpeace employs the IDEAL model11 to start its 
campaign, which consists in investigating through its investigation unit, 
documenting to show what is happening, exposing the environmental crime 
to attract followers, acting by carrying out an action to create a change 
and finally lobbying the governments and companies to adopt solutions to 
environmental problems (Greenpeace, 2015a).
In the light of these findings it seems safe to state that international 
ENGOs positively contributed to the Chinese environment protection. 
Generally speaking, the adaptation process to the Chinese local context 
11 Investigating, Documenting, Exposing, Acting and, at the end, Lobbying. 
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encouraged them to establish a tight collaboration with central and local 
governments, state agencies and private companies, and, even employing 
different strategies, it pushed them to adopt a non-confrontational attitude. 
However, the implementation of the “Law on the Administration of the 
Activities of Overseas Nongovernmental Organisations in Mainland China”, 
opened a new scenery for international NGOs. Details and implication of 
the new law will be discussed in the following chapters. 
4.3. International ENGOs and Chinese civil society
Generally speaking, environmental pollution centred on cities is still 
increasing, and creeping into the villages. The scope of environmental 
destruction is increasing, and its seriousness, too (NEPA, no date, cited 
in Vermeer, 1998: 960).With this extract from the 9th FYP (1996-2000), 
China’s leadership admitted the seriousness of pollution increase in 
China. However, at the end of the 90s, public awareness regarding the 
consequences of the Chinese environment degradation was still limited. An 
urban survey shows that peoples’ major concerns related to the increasing 
pollution were circumscribed to water and air pollution (Vermeer, 1998). 
In order to further enhance civil society participation towards a more 
conscious attitude regarding environmental issues, the government 
released the “State Council Decision Concerning Certain Environmental 
Protection Issues” (1996), which encouraged public reporting on violations 
of environmental protection laws and regulations (Schwartz, 2004). Social 
attention to a more environment-caring attitude was also driven by the 
harmful impact that some government’s projects have had on Chinese 
environment. Located at Sandouping of Yichang city, in Hubei province, the 
Three Gorges dam generates 18,200MW and an average annual output of 
84.7 terawatt-hours (trillion watt hours) (Jiazhu, 2002). Its negative impact 
on rare species of dolphins and sturgeons and the forced resettlement of 
at least 1.3 million people, caused contestations and demonstrations at 
national level (Ho, 2001).
The need for a strengthened civil society to face the multitude of 
Chinese environmental issues (Schwartz, 2004), the rapid impoverishment 
of Chinese environment and the increased social attention on environmental 
issues (Ho, 2001) facilitated a rapid growth of Chinese environmental social 
organisations. China’s official regulation call them shehui tuanti or private, 
non-profit work units minban fei qiye danwei (Yang, 2005). 
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Analyzing this phenomenon, Yang (2005) divided Chinese environmental 
NGOs in China in seven different types, underlying a different registration 
status for each group, as shown in Table 2:
Table 2: Different types of Chinese environmental NGOs in China (Yang, 2005)
Organizational type Registration status
Registered NGOs
Registered as social organizations or 
private, non-profit work units
Non-profit enterprises
Registered as business enterprises but 
operate as non-profit organizations
Unregistered voluntary groups
Unregistered organizations that 
function as NGOs
Web-based groups
Unregistered groups that operate 
mainly through internet
Student environmental associations
Registered with campus Youth Leagues 
yet function and perceived as NGOs
University research centers/Institutes
Affiliated with institutions of higher 
learning but operate as NGOs
Government-organised NGOs (GONGOs)
Social organizations established by 
state agencies also known as state-
owned NGOs (SONGOs)
 The registration status basically clarifies what is the relation with 
government and state agencies and provides an idea about the space of 
maneuver NGOs have. Schwartz (2004) highlighted weaknesses and strengths 
of Chinese traditional NGOs and GONGOs. Traditional NGOs’ weaknesses 
mostly lie in the shortage of experienced and professional staff, lack 
of access to relevant and sensitive data, extreme difficulty in obtaining 
funding and highly dependence on the leading figure. On this last point, for 
instance, Friends of Nature (FON), one of the earliest and most relevant 
Chinese environmental NGO, was founded in 1993 and officially registered 
in 1994 by Liang Congjie, the grandson of the well-known reformer Liang 
Qichao. Only thanks to his ability to treat such a sensitive topic and his 
connection within the political structure, he successfully mobilised the 
environmental movement in China, achieving global recognition (Shapiro, 
2012).
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Like Liang Congjie, Liao Xiaoyi established Global Village of Beijing 
(GVB) in 1996, with the main purposes of improving environmental 
education. She employed a really different approach from Liang’s. 
Founding her organisation as a business, she avoided the supervision from 
a supervising agency. In her views, an efficient environment protection 
program needs to involve government, enterprises and non-profit sector 
at the same time, highly relying also on media’s influence. By organizing 
conferences on sustainable consumption with the participation of NGOs 
leaders, senior Chinese officials, officials from the UNEP and UNDP and 
business leaders, allowed her not only to have national and international 
visibility, but also to enhance public education on environmental matters 
(Economy, 2004). Despite tireless efforts made by such strong personalities 
and their organisations, due to the difficulties listed above, Chinese NGOs 
have a constricted space of maneuver and a limited impact on decision-
making process. On the other side, GONGOs enjoy a completely different 
existence: their establishment within the political structure gives them 
an easier access to relevant data and the possibility to count on the 
most qualified, experienced and professional researchers and staff. Since 
GONGOs’ members are usually former government officials, relations and 
contacts with state bureaucracy are usually free of obstacles. Obviously 
this tight relation with the central state deeply influences their research 
area, which largely corresponds to government’s agenda (Schwartz, 2004). 
Presence of international ENGOs partially helped to overcome 
some challenges that traditional Chinese NGOs face in the domestic 
environment. Besides giving support to their Chinese counterparts in 
becoming more mature civil society actors, international ENGOs deeply 
contributed in introducing them into the global community (Chen, 2010). 
After the international embarrassment at 1992 UNCED, due to the lack 
of Chinese NGOs, Liao Xiaoyi led the organisation of an exhibition for 
the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg 
(2002). It represented the occasion to introduce many Chinese NGOs to the 
international community (Economy, 2004). On the financial aspect, many 
NGOs may count on international funding provided by western foundations 
and international NGOs to realize their projects: for example 44% of FON’s 
income in 2004-2005, 60% in 2005-2006 and 70-80% of GVB’s income derived 
from INGO and foundations (Chen, 2010). INGOs have also supported 
environmental activists against ambitious governmental projects. During 
the 2003-2004 campaign against the construction of 13 hydroelectric dams 
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on Nujiang River, in South-West Yunnan Province, INGOs helped in attracting 
international visibility (Chen, 2010). Even though the major international 
ENGOs, such as TNC, WWF and Greenpeace never officially joined the 
campaign, thanks to a multilevel collaboration between Chinese ENGOs, 
national media, scientists, and members of the government it was possible 
to stop the government’s project. The most relevant ally for Chinese ENGOs 
was the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA).12 Its collaboration 
mainly consisted in a personal association between activists and a senior 
official and in the support from the Vice-Minister Pan Yue (Buesgen, 2008). 
The campaign successfully resulted in the temporary suspension of the 
dams’ project. In the former premier Wen Jiabao’s words: “We should 
carefully consider and make scientific decision about major hydro-electric 
projects like this that have aroused a high level of concern in society, and 
with which the environmental protection side disagrees” (cited in Buesgen, 
2008: 168).
As Buesgen (2008) concluded, the success of this campaign highly 
depended on the heterogeneity of the partners that took part in it. 
He, therefore, suggests that the simple dichotomous state/civil society 
approach is not sufficient to explain the reality of the Chinese social 
context. His research shows how Chinese civil society may have an impact 
on decision-making process through the mobilisation of an expanded 
network. The success of the campaign also demonstrates how looking 
at social organisations solely within the “transmission belt” framework 
(Woodman 1997, cited in Hsia and White, 2002: 331) and by a top-down 
corporatist approach is no longer appropriate.13 To stress on this point of 
view, Saich (2000) cites the example of FON. By utilizing his connection 
and political skills, Liang Congjie has been able to lead his NGO through a 
series of successful projects to protect natural habitat of golden monkeys 
in Yunnan. By mobilizing public support and catching media attention, he 
made the local authorities ban activities which would endanger golden 
monkeys’ natural habitat. A further example is given by GVB’s activity. Liao 
Xiaoyi focused her attention on urban issues and community development. 
12 Currently the Ministry of Environment (MEP).
13 According to the conventional corporatist approach, social organisations should serve government’s 
purposes. Using Woodman words, the state looks at them as “transmission belt” which convey central 
ideas and purposes from the top to the bottom in a hierarchical and vertical manner.
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By partnering with the government, local EPB and other departments of 
the local government, GVB launched a recycling project in Xuanwu district 
in Beijing to enhance public attention on a green and energy-saving life. 
Green River14 has been devoted to the nature protection in the headwater 
region of the Yangtze River to fight the poaching of the Tibetan antelope 
and to foster environmental research in the area. The success that this 
NGO achieved has been partly facilitated by the good connections with 
local government officials (Economy, 2004). The corporatist and top-down 
system has been also altered by the presence of international ENGOs in 
China. 
Partnering with international ENGOs provides Chinese ENGOs with the 
opportunity to not only gain an international exposure by participating to 
international conferences, but also allows them to broaden their knowledge 
regarding environmental issues. Most of the benefits derive from “funding, 
information exchange, mutual learning and easy access to expertise on 
climate change”15 (Schroeder, 2008: 520). Their relation also shapes the 
role that Chinese ENGOs have had on democratic and political change. 
They established public platforms to facilitate public participation and 
volunteerism, launched public debates and became more involved in the 
decision-making process regarding environmental matters (Chen, 2010).
The top-down and corporatist approach definitively seems not 
sufficient to explain the dynamic world of Chinese civil society, which results 
deeply influenced by the presence of the international ENGOs helping them 
in realizing their projects and strengthening horizontal contacts. However, 
as Saich (2000) pointed out, even the most autonomous organisation need 
to take into account relations with central authorities, if it aims to influence 
the decision-making process. 
4.4. Chinese legal framework: The evolutionary relationship between 
international ENGOs and the government
Before 1978 the great majority of social organisations consisted of 
highly-bureaucratised and hierarchically-organised social organisations 
which had a tight and strong relationship with the central party (Whiting, 
1991). At that time China’s government deemed foreign organisations as 
14 Chinese NGO founded by Yang Xing.
15 Based on the interviews carried out by the author.
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unnecessary and dangerous (Hsia and White, 2002). The regulation governing 
social organisations was the State Council’s 1950 “Interim Provision on the 
Registration of Social Organization”. However, starting from the reform 
period, social aggregation phenomenon increased dramatically and many 
foreign foundations, private and non-profit research institutes, schools and 
hospitals were founded (Whiting, 1991). Chinese government looked at 
them, on one side, as valuable partners in providing assistance to foster 
China’s development in terms of funds, advanced technology and foreign 
expertise and, on the other side, as competitors for international funds and 
potential enemies because bearers of western democratic values (Shieh, 
2012). 
In the eyes of the China’s leadership, the proliferation of these 
organisations and Tiananmen’s crackdown in June 1989, revealed the need 
for a new set of rules regarding social organisations. Therefore, in 1989, 
the State Council promulgated the “Regulations on the registration and 
management of Social Groups”. In 1998, these regulations were revised 
(Guowuyuan, 1998a)16 alongside with the promulgation of the “Provisional 
regulations on the registration and management of people-organized and 
non-enterprise units” (Guowuyuan, 1998b).17 If on one side they represented 
the official recognition of the legal status of such organisations, they also 
imposed some limitations. According to Saich (2000: 129), these regulations 
“provide a clear example of the attempt to incorporate social organisations 
more closely with existing party-state structures”. Those restrictions are 
mainly related to the obligation to have a sponsor unit and the prohibition to 
establish more than one organisation in the same area of work (Yang, 2005). 
Registration process consisted on a first examination led by a professional 
leading unit (yewu zhanguan danwei) and, if successful, the application for 
registration could have been submitted to the Ministry of Civil Affairs.18 As 
Yang (2005) highlighted, this mechanism facilitated the increase of student 
associations which were not required to follow the same registration's path. 
16 Analysis of the law based on the translation provided by the CDB visible at the following link: 
http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.cn/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Regulations-for-Registration-and-
Management-of-Social-Associations.pdf 
17 Analysis of the law based on the translation provided by the CDB visible at the following link: http://
chinadevelopmentbrief.cn/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/PROVISIONAL-REGULATIONS-FOR-THE-REGISTRA-
TION-AND-MANAGEMENT-OF-CIVIL-NON-ENTERPRISE-WORK-UNITS1.pdf 
18 Art. 9 of “Regulations on the registration and management of social groups”.
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However, the failing in registration implied serious obstacles in obtaining 
funding, legal protection and government collaboration (Schwartz, 2004). 
According to the regulation, NGOs application was rejected in the case 
its activity oppose the basic principles of the constitution, harm the unity 
security or ethnic harmony of the state, or interests of the state and society, 
or the lawful interests of other organisations or citizens, or offend social 
morality (Art 4 of the “Regulations on the registration and management of 
social groups”).
As Hsia and White (2002) stated, these two regulations did not 
concern foreign organisations, which should operate under separated 
rules. However, no specific regulation for international NGOs had been 
implemented until January 2017. The only foreign NGOs-related regulation 
was a five-point policy, adopted by the Ministry of Civil Affairs in 1989, 
which advised local Civil Affairs Bureaus to:
maintain contact with foreign groups openly operating, provided 
their activities were confined to social communication and 
friendship; not to take the initiative to contact groups that were 
not operating openly; tell representatives of foreign groups that 
inquired about registration that regulation were being drafted; 
ensure that foreign groups did not interfere with official business 
or perform any diplomatic functions on behalf of their embassies or 
consulates; enforce the rule that Chinese citizens are not permitted 
to join foreign groups or participate in any of their activities without 
receiving permissions to do so from the foreign affairs departments 
of their work unit (Human Rights in China, 1997). 
The only foreign NGOs-related regulation was the “Regulations on 
foundation administration” (Guowuyuan 1998c) which was first issued in 
1998 and revised in 2004. It allowed foreign NGOs to register a representative 
office in China (Shieh, 2012), but it did not make this process compulsory.
The lack of a clear legal framework reflected the government’s tolerant 
behaviour and its ambiguous opinion about INGOs, which were deemed as 
useful entities to address China’s development issues as long as they did 
not interfere in sensitive issues (Hsia and White, 2002; Ma, 2006; Schwartz, 
2004; Shieh, 2012). However, this situation of uncertainty considerably 
changed with the promulgation of the “Law of the People’s Republic of 
China on the Administration of the Activities of Overseas Nongovernmental 
Organizations within Mainland China” (Guowuyuan, 2017).
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First of all as “Overseas NGOs” the law refers to the no-profit, non-
governmental social organisations that have been lawfully established 
outside mainland China involved in fields such as economy, education, 
science and technology, culture, health, sports, environmental protection, 
poverty alleviation and disaster relief. 19 According to this law, all the 
Overseas NGOs (for convenience ONGOs hereafter) shall register and 
establish a representative office in China, while unregistered ONGOs, 
which wish to conduct temporary activities in China, shall file a record.20 
A similarity with the “Regulations on the registration and management of 
social groups”, can be noted in the Professional Supervisory Units, from 
which, ONGOs intentioned to register and establish a representative office, 
shall receive a consent.21 Knup (cited in Hsia and White, 2002: 339) called 
them “mother-in-law”. The supervision of the Professional Supervisory Unit 
mainly consists in screening the activity plan that the ONGO should submit 
every year before the December 30th, in which it shall indicate projects’ 
details it is intended to run.22 ONGOs are also required to submit an annual 
report that firstly shall be given to their Professional Supervisory Unit, after 
whose feedback, shall be sent to the registration management authorities 
by March 31st for annual inspection23. Professional Supervisory Unit are also 
required to give advices to ONGOs to set up their representative office, 
to oversee ONGOs activities and to assist public security authorities in 
investigating and punishing illegal activities24. Regarding favorable policies, 
the law establishes some tax benefits for ONGOs.25 
The implementation of this law is an obvious attempt to fulfill the 
lack of the legal framework which regulates INGOs. Like the “Regulations 
on the registration and management of social groups” revised in 1998, 
this law simultaneously recognises ONGOs legal status and clarifies their 
19 Art. 2 and 3.
20 Art. 9.
21 Art. 9 of the “Regulations on the registration and management of social groups” and art. 11 
of the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of the Activities of Overseas 
Nongovernmental Organisations in Mainland China”. 
22 Art. 19.
23 Art. 31.
24 Art. 40.
25 Art. 36.
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space of maneuver. The most discussed concern is the obligation to find a 
Professional Supervisory Unit: as Sze Pang Cheung, Executive Director of 
Greenpeace East Asia, said “for many years the Chinese government has 
given tacit consent to the activities of many overseas NGOs in China. And 
for those NGOs the biggest hurdle to acquiring legal status is not so much 
political – it will be overcoming the bureaucratic obstacles to registering 
in accordance with the rules” (Haiying, 2016). This concern is shared 
by Jia Xijin, professor at Tsinghua University who, speaking about the 
Professional Supervisory Unit, highlights three main concerns: 1) contact 
the actual responsible department; 2) wait for a reply from the Professional 
Supervisory Unit; 3) the discretionary power the Professional Supervisory 
Unit holds for establish the field of activity (Xijin, 2017).
Concerns are not restricted to the Professional Supervisory Unit: being 
supervised by the Public Security Bureau rather than by the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs, ONGOs may be perceived more as a risk rather than government’s 
partner. However, Zhang Yong26 reassured on Chinese government intentions, 
stressing on how it always had welcomed ONGOs, but due to a small number 
of ONGOs engaged in activities which could endanger China’s social stability 
and state security, it is necessary to apply the rule of law (Denyer, 2016). 
The compulsory approval from a Professional Supervisory Unit and the Public 
Security Bureau appointed in charge for the registration and management 
for ONGOs, clearly shows Chinese government’s intention to put ONGOs’ 
increasing phenomenon under a higher scrutiny and control. Speaking of 
the “Regulations on the registration and management of social groups”, 
Schwartz (2004) stated that, thanks to the authority that the relevant 
government bureau holds to shut down an NGO in the case its activity 
has been deemed as unsatisfactory, the government actually decides the 
NGOs’ fate. Even though the legal space of maneuver for ONGOs is clearly 
defined within the art 4, which states that ONGOs shall operate according 
to the law without threatening China’s security or national and ethnicity 
unity, harming China’s national interest, societal public interests, and the 
legal right of citizens, legal person and other groups, the art. 15 comma 
4, which states that “the representative office of an overseas NGO may be 
publically de-registered by the registration management authorities if the 
26 Member of the NPC’s Legislative Affairs Committee.
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activities of the NGO are no longer permitted due to other reasons”, gives 
to the authorities an undefined space to exert their authority.
Shieh (2016) interprets the implementation of the law as part of 
Xi Jinping’s policy to govern the country according to the law. The law 
simultaneously provides ONGOs with a legal status and well-defined 
boundaries for their activities and protects China from external threats. 
However, the potential to restrict foreign funding (Hsu and Hasmath, 
2017), could have a harmful impact on domestic NGOs opportunities to 
grow and develop within the national and international community. From 
this perspective, GONGOs are more likely to emerge as the principal civil 
society actors, providing the central authorities with the opportunity to 
foster Chinese government’s agenda through social actors strictly connected 
with the centre. A more optimistic opinion is provided by Hsu and Teets 
(2016), who consider the implementation of the law as the opportunity 
for domestic NGOs to be emancipated from the heavy reliance on INGOs. 
According to their view, the implementation of the new law, alongside 
with the new proposed draft of the charity law, shows the leadership’s 
preference for a Chinese civil sector populated by indigenous actors rather 
than internationals.
After a month of its implementation, Professor Jia Xijin highlighted 
how the first ONGOs registered were the ones already registered with the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs or with the Administration of Industry and Commerce 
under the Rules on the Management of Foundations. He also noted how 
priority had been given to the economic field, since the ONGOs legally 
recognized within the first month were all active in the economic field (Jia, 
2017). After 8 months of implementation (August 2017), the economic field 
still results the prioritized one, with a 22.6% of the total ONGOs registered. 
However, many representative offices of organisations27 that work in poverty 
alleviation, disaster relief, health, environmental protection, education, 
culture and sport field have been opened. 
Focusing on the environment field, it is important to note that 
historic ONGOs like WWF, TNC and CI have already obtained their legal 
status. Respectively established in China in 1980, 1998 and 2002 they have 
witnessed the process of the opening-up reform and its environmental 
27 The total number of representative offices opened are 99. 73 of the ONGOs listed are active in 
more than one field. 
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drawbacks. They have collaborated with Chinese government in order 
to protect Chinese environment. The registration of their representative 
offices testifies their relevance in this process, it shows China’s intention to 
foster its cooperation with the international community and partly confirms 
Hsu and Teets (2016) opinion that law’s implementation would not cause 
dramatic changes. 
It is difficult to predict future consequences of the implementation 
of this law, however, I tend to agree with Hsu and Teets (2016) who suggest 
that, more likely, the smaller social organisations involved in sensitive areas 
may find more difficulties in finding a Professional Supervisory Unit and 
complete the registration process. As TNC’s experience shows, the hardest 
challenge was to find a Professional Supervisory Unit suitable to establish a 
representative office in China. However, its long-lasting partnership with the 
State Forestry Administration of China made the whole process smoother 
with the two parts honored to foster this collaboration (CDB, 2017). As Hsu 
and Teets stated (2016: 12) for larger and well-established ONGOs, the 
implementation of the law will basically consist in an “additional layer of 
government approvals for collaborating with domestic groups, hiring, and 
recruiting volunteers”. However, everything will depend on the relation that 
ONGOs will establish with the Professional Supervisory Unit and on the Public 
Security Bureau enforcement of the law. 
5. Conclusions
Global warming and climate change are rapidly emerging as major 
concerns in global politics and as a top-priority matter in domestic affairs 
of many different countries. The shift from the no-debate behaviour in 
the UNCHE to the active and leading role employed during the successful 
COP21, shows how environmentalism has become a state-priority in 
China, and how it has helped to enhance its role within the international 
community. The renewed attention to the harmful environmental impact 
of decades of high reliance of coal and oil consumption and the improved 
contacts with international institutions and other organisations, have been 
both facilitated by the presence of international ENGOs in China. For 
China, the arrival of international ENGOs meant a step forward in terms of 
professional expertise and implementation of advanced technology. Their 
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usual large disposal of funds and their connections with the international 
community have also helped Chinese civil society to emerge and increase 
public attention towards environment protection; furthermore, they have 
encouraged domestic NGOs relations with international partners. At this 
stage, international ENGOs relation with Chinese partners consisted in a 
donor-recipient collaboration. However, they had to adapt to the Chinese 
political and social context. The partnership with Chinese government, 
state agencies and private companies, shows how a collaborating behaviour 
rather than a confrontational one has been fruitful in order to implement 
a diverse amount of projects to protect Chinese environment. At the same 
time the IDEAL strategy, employed by Greenpeace, shows that there is still 
space to independently investigate, report and denounce illegal and harmful 
activity. As democratic organisations, which act in public interest and are 
independent from government, in the eyes of China’s leadership, they also 
constitute a probable threat to national security and domestic interests. 
This ambiguous and contradictory opinion regarding international NGOs, 
clearly explained the lack of the foreign NGOs-related legal framework. 
However, the implementation of the “Law of the People’s Republic of 
China on the Administration of the Activities of Overseas Nongovernmental 
Organizations within Mainland China”, in January 2017, establishes new 
regulations for INGOs which wish to conduct activities in China. This 
clearly represents China’s leadership attempt to eliminate the legal gap 
and to put INGOs under higher scrutiny and control. It also reveals how 
the donor-recipient collaboration, which had deeply characterized the 80s 
and 90s, has shifted its course, towards an equal-contributor partnership 
between international NGOs and government’s departments in a legal and 
well-defined environment. After a first period of its implementation, the 
largest international ENGOs (WWF, TNC and CI) have already received their 
legal status, confirming China’s intention to foster its collaboration with 
international actors. From this fact, it can be inferred that no huge changes 
will occur, however, smaller organisations involved in sensitive areas, might 
struggle in finding a Professional Supervisory Unit necessary to complete 
the registration process. Further researches may focus on how this law will 
differently impact larger and smaller international NGOs. 
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